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ABSTRACT
States inevitably take different political positions on various issues and implement laws based on those views.
However, the Constitution does not give states license to economically sanction states with different ideologies in
an effort to coerce those states to change their laws. In this era of heightened political division, it is unsurprising
that a number of states have implemented travel bans that prevent the use of state funds in states that have passed
laws supporting alternative political ideologies. Interstate economic warfare is certainly not a phenomenon that
the Framers of the Constitution envisioned. Applying long-standing Supreme Court jurisprudence, this Article
argues that state-implemented travel bans are unconstitutional because they violate the dormant commerce clause
and cannot be shielded by the Tenth Amendment. As the Court has unanimously explained, the Constitution
“was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long
run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.” Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
523 (1935).
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INTRODUCTION
New York was the first state to issue an executive order banning statefunded travel to other states due to their discriminatory laws relating to
sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression.1 More
specifically, New York has banned state-funded travel to Indiana, North
Carolina, and Mississippi due to their discriminatory laws targeting lesbian,
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (“LGBTQ”) individuals.2 California
was the first state to enact a statute (“California’s Travel Ban”) banning its
employees, the nation’s largest state-employed workforce,3 from using state
funds to travel to eleven states—Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas—that have
discriminatory laws relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, and
gender expression.4 Several other states and territories—Connecticut,5

1
2
3

4

5

See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.144 (2015) (prohibiting state-funded or statesponsored travel to Indiana).
See id.; see also id. § 8.155 (2016) (prohibiting state-funded or state-sponsored travel to North
Carolina); id. § 8.156 (2016) (prohibiting state-funded or state-sponsored travel to Mississippi).
See Rebecca Beitsch, Supposedly Symbolic, State Travel Bans Have Real Bite, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2017,
10:57 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/stateline/stateline-supposedly-symbolic-state-travelbans-have-real-bite-idUSL2N1L10VX (discussing recent state employee travel bans to states that,
in their view, discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals).
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017) (banning state-funded or state-sponsored travel to
any state that discriminates “on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender
expression”). Although California prevents its “employees, officers, or members” from using statefunds to travel to the Banned States, this Article simply refers to them as “employees.” This would
include, for example, students that are enrolled at the University of California and California State
University. See id. (emphasis added) (“A state agency, department, board, authority, or commission,
including an agency, department, board, authority, or commission of the University of California,
the Board of Regents of the University of California, or the California State University, and the
Legislature shall not . . . [r]equire any of its employees, officers, or members to travel to a state that, after
June 26, 2015, has enacted a law that voids or repeals, or has the effect of voiding or repealing,
existing state or local protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender
identity, or gender expression or has enacted a law that authorizes or requires discrimination
against same-sex couples or their families or on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, or
gender expression, including any law that creates an exemption to antidiscrimination laws in order
to permit discrimination against same-sex couples or their families or on the basis of sexual
orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.”).
See Conn. Exec. Order No. 52, (Mar. 31, 2016), available at https://portal.ct.gov//media/066B46D7631145CBA35FCE3BBB2685A8.pdf (banning state-funded travel to North
Carolina).
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Minnesota,6 Vermont,7 Washington,8 and the District of Columbia9—also
demonstrated disapproval of discriminatory laws relating to sexual
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression, and thus implemented
similar travel bans through executive action.10

6

7

8

9

10

See Governor Bans Nonessential Travel to North Carolina, MPR NEWS (Apr. 2, 2016, 11:45 AM),
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2016/04/02/governor-bans-nonessential-travel-to-north-caroli
na (summarizing Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton’s letter to all state employees banning all
nonessential state-funded travel to North Carolina); see also Chris Johnson, Minnesota to Keep N.C.
Travel Ban as Other States Demur, WASH. BLADE (Apr. 5, 2017, 5:19 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonblade.com/2017/04/05/minnesota-keep-n-c-travel-ban-states-demur/ (explaining that
“Minnesota has become the first state to announce it will retain its travel ban to North Carolina”).
See Press Release, Governor Shumlin Bans Official State Travel to North Carolina (Mar. 30, 2016),
available at https://vtdigger.org/2016/03/30/gov-shumlin-bans-official-state-travel-to-north-caro
lina/ (quoting a memorandum from Vermont Secretary of Administration Justin Johnson to the
Vermont Executive Cabinet (on file with author) that stated: “Until further notice, the Governor
has banned official state travel to North Carolina. This is in response to the recent passage of a law
in that state that overturns anti-discrimination protections for [LGBTQ] individuals. The ban is
in effect until further notice and applies to all travel requests from this date forward. If you feel you
have extraordinary circumstances that require an exemption, please appeal directly to me”).
See Press Release, Inslee Signs New Travel Ban to North Carolina (Apr. 14, 2017), available at
https://www.governor.wa.gov/news-media/inslee-signs-new-travel-ban-north-carolina (stating
that Washington Governor Jay Inslee issued a memorandum to state agencies prohibiting statefunded travel to North Carolina).
See Ban on Travel to the State of North Carolina, Mayor’s Order No. 2016-040 (Mar. 31, 2016),
available at https://mayor.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/mayormb/publication/attachments
/2016-040%20Ban%20on%20Travel%20to%20the%20State%20of%20North%20Carolina.pdf
(“To ensure a constant voice in policy and practice in the District of Columbia in favor of equal
treatment for members of the LGBTQ communities, no officer or employee of the District of
Columbia is authorized to approve any official travel to North Carolina until such time that the
Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act is permanently enjoined, repealed or amended to allow
local jurisdictions to enact laws protecting the LGBTQ communities from discrimination and to
enact laws allowing persons to use restrooms that correspond to their gender identity.”); see also Lou
Chibbaro Jr., Bowser Bans D.C. Gov’t Travel to North Carolina, WASH. BLADE (Apr. 1, 2016, 3:51 PM),
https://www.washingtonblade.com/2016/04/01/bowser-bans-d-c-govt-travel-to-north-carolina/
(reporting Mayor Bowser’s travel ban).
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Mar. 12, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (“Although [California] is not aware of legislation in other states that has
bans on state-funded travel, a number of states and localities have, by executive order, taken such
steps. For example, shortly after Governor Pence signed the Indiana law, the Governors of
Connecticut, New York, and Washington banned state-funded for travel to Indiana by executive
order. Similarly, at about the same time, the mayors of San Francisco and Seattle banned cityfunded travel to Indiana.”); see also STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON ACCOUNTABILITY &
ADMIN. REVIEW, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. Apr. 11, 2016),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887#
(“North Carolina and Mississippi enacted discriminatory laws relating to sexual orientation, gender
identity, and gender expression. In response, other states have banned non-essential travel to North
Carolina and Mississippi via gubernatorial or administrative, rather than legislative, action.”).
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A state-implemented travel ban refers to one state’s prohibition of its
employees from traveling to another state using state funds. Such bans could
occur if one state opposes a policy adopted by another state. There are
serious constitutional issues11 that arise when a state implements—or
sponsors—a ban on travel to other states with differing political views.12
State-implemented travel bans have proven to be effective. For example,
New York’s travel bans, coupled with other state-implemented travel bans
and private boycotts, forced Indiana and North Carolina to amend or repeal
existing discriminatory legislation.13 Otherwise, if state-implemented travel
bans were proven to be ineffective, it would be illogical for other states and
territories, like California, Connecticut, Minnesota, Vermont, Washington,
and the District of Columbia, to initiate their own travel bans.14 These travel
bans resulted in the cancellation of several conventions, events, and hotel
bookings, costing states millions of dollars.15
This Article argues that state-implemented travel bans, irrespective of
their policy goals, are unconstitutional and create a grave danger to
individual states’ democracies. Although the majority of state-implemented
travel bans today are implemented to effect positive change—deterring
discriminatory laws relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, and
gender expression—this does not mean that these bans would always be used
justly. This Article condemns discrimination at any level, and against any

11

12

13
14
15

Although this Article will only focus on the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment, there
may be challenges to state-implemented travel bans on other constitutional grounds, such as the
unenumerated rights of travel under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
State-implemented travel bans differ from private travel bans. For example, the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, American Airlines, International Business Machines, Biogen, and PayPal
Holdings, are private companies that have boycotted or implemented private travel bans against
North Carolina due to its discriminatory laws. See Major Businesses Stand Against North Carolina Law
That Bans Anti-Discrimination Measures, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2016, 5:23 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-north-carolina-anti-discrimination-law-2
0160324-story.html (detailing the responses of several private organizations to the North Carolina
law). Further, this Article only discusses states severing economic ties with other states, not other
countries. Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (holding that a
Massachusetts law barring state actors from purchasing goods or services from companies doing
business in Burma is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause); see also Odebrecht Constr.,
Inc. v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding a Florida statute
prohibiting the state from awarding public contracts in excess of one million dollars to companies
conducting business operations in Cuba to be unconstitutional because it conflicted with federal
law and undermined the President’s discretionary authority).
Discussed infra in Part II.A.
See supra text accompanying notes 4–9.
See Beitsch, supra note 3.
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person or group, but state-implemented travel bans are not the only way to
deter discriminatory laws relating to sexual orientation, gender identity, and
gender expression.
The Fourteenth Amendment was once used by Congress to deter racial
discrimination by private actors.16 However, the United States Supreme
Court17 held—and later reaffirmed—that Congress may not use the
Fourteenth Amendment to regulate private conduct, as the Fourteenth
Amendment expressly states “No state shall . . . .”18 But that did not mean
that the Fourteenth Amendment was the only way to deter racial
discrimination by private actors, as the Court later held that the Commerce
Clause may be used to prevent private actors from discriminating on the basis
of race.19 A comparable legal mechanism could be established to prevent
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender
expression. Although not state action, private organizations—like the
National Basketball Association, National Collegiate Athletic Association,
American Airlines, International Business Machines, Biogen, and PayPal
Holdings—have boycotted states with discriminatory laws relating to sexual
orientation, gender identity, and gender expression, without violating the
Constitution.20

16

17
18

19

20

See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot
be used by Congress to regulate private activity or bar discrimination by private individuals). The
Civil Rights Act of 1875 provided: “all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and
privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public
amusement; subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike
to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.”
This Article refers to the United States Supreme Court as the “Court.” All other courts located
within the United States will be specified according to their designation.
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11–12 (“Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured by way of prohibition against State laws and
State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate
for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation must necessarily be
predicated upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction
of their operation and effect.”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (re-affirming
the Civil Rights Cases).
See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that Congress may
validly regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause); see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379
U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that Congress may bar discrimination by privately owned restaurants
because there is sufficient basis to conclude that such discrimination burdens interstate commerce).
See Beitsch, supra note 3; see also Major Businesses Stand Against North Carolina Law That Bans AntiDiscrimination Measures, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2016, 5:23 PM), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-north-carolina-anti-discrimination-law-20160324-story.html.
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If state-implemented travel bans are permitted, nothing will stop states
from enacting travel bans for a whole host of other reasons. This is best
evidenced by a Tennessee assembly bill condemning California’s Travel Ban,
while ironically enacting its own travel ban against California simply because
California banned travel to Tennessee first.21 A senator from Tennessee even
opined that “California has potentially opened what could become an
economic civil war between the states.”22 The Tennessee assembly bill is a
perfect example of how states can issue travel bans against one another for
any reason of their choosing. For example, states that do not practice capital
punishment could enact travel bans against states that have the death penalty
until such penalty is repealed. States that have set the age of consent at
eighteen years could issue travel bans to states where the age of consent is
sixteen or seventeen until those states raise the age of consent to eighteen.
States that permit recreational and medical use of marijuana could issue
travel bans to states that ban marijuana until those states adopt similar liberal
policies. Non-sanctuary states could issue travel bans to sanctuary states until
those states begin enforcing federal immigration laws. In other words, travel
bans, if successful, could be used as a cudgel to coerce other states to enact
policies that they otherwise would not. The Court, however, has emphasized
that a state may not penalize “conduct that was lawful where it occurred and
that had no impact on [the state] or its residents. Nor may [a state] impose
sanctions . . . in order to deter conduct that is lawful in other jurisdictions.”23
As the above examples illustrate, it is inevitable that states will disagree
on politics and it is equally undeniable that states depend on each other for
economic growth and stability. The Court has consistently recognized that
“one of the happy incidents of the federal system [is] that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”24
Furthermore, the Court has also consistently emphasized that—under the

21
22
23
24

See S.J. Res. 110-111 (Tenn. 2017), http://www.capitol.tn.gov/Bills/110/Bill/SJR0111.pdf.
See Beitsch, supra note 3.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996) (footnote omitted).
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015) (“This Court
has ‘long recognized the role of the States as laboratories for devising solutions to difficult legal
problems.’”) (citing Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 171 (2009)); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he States may perform their role as laboratories for
experimentation to devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”).
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dormant commerce clause of the Constitution—states may not enact
legislation that affects interstate commerce.25
State-implemented travel bans create a serious threat to our nation’s
Constitution and individual states’ democracies. Although the Court—
pursuant to the dormant commerce clause—has held that states may not
enact legislation that affects interstate commerce, the entire purpose of a
state-implemented travel ban is to impede the free flow of interstate
commerce until a political agenda is achieved. Moreover, if a state issues a
travel ban in hopes of changing another state’s policies—and the issuing state
is successful—then the targeted state’s residents are deprived of a
government that represents the will of the populace, thereby divorcing the
local government from the needs of local interests.26
If the Court considers constitutional challenges to state-implemented
travel bans, it would be a question of first impression. To that end, this
Article focuses on the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence to
argue that state-implemented travel bans violate the Constitution, and that
the Tenth Amendment does not permit them. Part I discusses why some
states have enacted travel bans and the reach of those bans. Part II discusses
what the dormant commerce clause is and how it affects state-implemented
travel bans. Part III discusses the exceptions to the dormant commerce
clause and how state-implemented travel bans do not fit squarely within any
of them. Part IV discusses the Tenth Amendment and how it does not permit
state-implemented travel bans. Finally, this Article concludes by asserting
that all state-implemented travel bans against states with differing political
views are unconstitutional.

25

26

See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989) (“This Court long has recognized that this
affirmative grant of authority to Congress also encompasses an implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on
the authority of the States to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.”) (emphasis added).
There may be an Article IV, Section 4 concern as each state is required to have a republican form
of government, but this argument is outside the scope of this Article. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4
(“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government
. . . .”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992) (“The States thereby retain the
ability to set their legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the local
electorate.”).
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I. EXISTING STATE-IMPLEMENTED TRAVEL BANS
A. New York’s Travel Bans
On March 31, 2015, New York’s Governor issued Executive Order 144,
banning state-funded travel to Indiana.27 Specifically, Executive Order 144
requires:
[a]ll agencies, departments, boards, authorities and commissions to review
all requests for state funded or state sponsored travel to the state of Indiana
so long as there is law in effect there that creates the grounds for
discrimination against [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer
(“LGBTQ”)] citizens . . . [and] [t]o bar any such publically [sic] funded or
publically [sic] sponsored travel to such location, unless such travel is
necessary for the enforcement of New York State law, to meet prior
contractual obligations, or for the protection of public health, welfare, and
safety.28

New York’s Governor issued Executive Order 144 in response to 2015
Indiana Senate Bill No. 101 (“SB101”), which essentially permitted private
businesses to discriminate against LGBTQ individuals based on sincerely
held religious beliefs.29 SB101 was signed into law by then-Governor Mike
Pence.30 Other states—such as Connecticut, Vermont, and Washington—
enacted similar travel bans forbidding state-funded travel to Indiana.31 New
York’s travel ban, coupled with other state-implemented travel bans and
private boycotts, cost Indiana an estimated $60 million.32 Severe public
disapproval and threats of additional boycotts forced then-Governor Mike

27
28
29
30

31

32

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.144 (2015).
Id.
S.B. 119-101, Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015). A detailed discussion of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, and its potential impact on businesses, is presented infra Part II.B.
See Jeremy Diamond, Indiana’s Religious Freedom Law: What You Need to Know, CNN POLITICS (Mar.
29, 2015, 4:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/27/politics/indiana-religous-freedomexplainer/index.html (describing the religious freedom bill in Indiana).
See Daniel Reynolds, Governors of Connecticut, New York, and Washington Ban Travel to Indiana,
ADVOCATE (Mar. 31, 2015, 3:09 PM),
https://www.advocate.com/politics/politicians/
2015/03/31/governors-connecticut-new-york-and-washington-ban-travel-indiana (noting that
governors of some states are “sending a strong message to Indiana and other states that pass [antiLGBTQ] legislation” through their travel bans); Press Release, supra note 7 (discussing how
Vermont Governor Peter Shumlin banned official travel to Indiana after it passed a state law
promoting LGBTQ discrimination).
Neal Broverman, Indiana Took $60 Million Hit After Passing Antigay Law, ADVOCATE (Jan. 26, 2016,
12:57 PM), https://www.advocate.com/religion/2016/1/26/indiana-took-60-million-hit-afterpassing-antigay-law.
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Pence and the Indiana legislature to amend SB101 within just one week of
its issuance.33
On March 28, 2016, New York’s Governor issued Executive Order 155,
which banned state-funded travel to North Carolina.34 Executive Order
155—similar to Executive Order 144—required:
[a]ll agencies, departments, boards, authorities and commissions to review
all requests for state funded or state sponsored travel to the state of North
Carolina so long as there is law in effect there that creates the grounds for
discrimination against [LGBTQ] citizens; and [t]o bar any such publicly
funded or publicly sponsored travel to [North Carolina], unless such travel
is necessary for the enforcement of New York State law, to meet prior
contractual obligations, or for the protection of public health, welfare, and
safety.35

New York initiated its travel ban against North Carolina because of the
Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, commonly
known as House Bill 2 (“HB2”). HB2 required, in pertinent part, that “every
multiple occupancy bathroom or changing facility . . . be designated for and
only used by persons based on their biological sex[,] . . . which is stated on a
person’s birth certificate.”36
Several states and territories—California, Connecticut, Minnesota,
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia—joined New York and
banned state-funded travel to North Carolina.37 Private organizations also
demonstrated disapproval by boycotting several events in North Carolina.38
33
34
35
36
37

38

Diamond, supra note 30; see also Beitsch, supra note 3 (discussing Indiana’s Religious Freedom
Restoration Act).
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.155 (2016) (prohibiting state-funded or statesponsored travel to North Carolina).
Id.
Carcano v. Cooper, 350 F. Supp. 3d 388, 399 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
See supra text accompanying notes 4–9; see also Abbie Bennett, HB2 Replacement Not Enough for New
York Governor to Lift Travel Ban to NC, NEWS & OBSERVER (May 3, 2017, 7:07 PM),
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article148488199.html
(noting the New York Governor’s re-affirmation of his state’s ban on taxpayer-funded travel to
North Carolina); Evan Grossman, More States Must Join New York in Taking Stand Against Discrimination,
With Laws That Are Impacting College Sports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 4, 2018, 3:28 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/college/states-join-ny-stand-discrimination-article-1.37379
39 (arguing that more than six states need to take actions in response to the anti-LGBTQ laws
enacted); Ginger O’Donnell, Several States Restrict Travel to Those with Anti-LGBTQ Laws, INSIGHT
INTO DIVERSITY (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.insightintodiversity.com/several-states-restricttravel-to-those-with-anti-lgbtq-laws/ (stating that as of January 2017, California prohibited travel
to eight states including North Carolina).
See Major Businesses Stand Against North Carolina Law That Bans Anti-Discrimination Measures, CHICAGO
TRIBUNE (Mar. 24, 2016, 5:23 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ctnorth-carolina-anti-discrimination-law-20160324-story.html (discussing disapproval of the bill by
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State-funded travel bans, coupled with private boycotts, led North Carolina
to repeal HB2 and adopt 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 4 (“HB142”). Even after the
adoption of HB142, New York did not lift its travel ban.39
On April 6, 2016, New York issued Executive Order 156, prohibiting
state-funded travel to Mississippi.40 The language of the executive order
mirrored the language of Executive Orders 144 and 155 by requiring:
[a]ll agencies, departments, boards, authorities and commissions to review
all requests for state funded or state sponsored travel to the state of
Mississippi so long as there is law in effect there that permits and enshrines
discrimination against [LGBTQ] citizens and unmarried individuals; and
[t]o bar any such publicly funded or publicly sponsored travel to such
location, unless such travel is necessary for the enforcement of New York
State law, to meet prior contractual obligations, or for the protection of
public health, welfare, and safety.41

New York’s Governor issued Executive Order 156 in response to
Mississippi House Bill No. 1523, which essentially permitted businesses to
refuse service to individuals due to their sexual orientation or gender identity.42 Several states—including Minnesota, Vermont, and Washington—

39

40
41
42

private organizations); see also Beitsch, supra note 3 (noting the economic hardship North Carolina
faced).
See Beitsch, supra note 3; Bennett, supra note 37; Jon Campbell, Cuomo’s Travel Ban Keeps SUNY
Swimmers From Staying in North Carolina, DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Mar. 7, 2019, 6:42 PM),
https://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/politics/albany/2019/03/07/cuomos-trav
el-ban-keeps-suny-swimmers-staying-north-carolina/3090812002/.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.156 (2016).
Id.
Id.; see H.B. 2016-1523, Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2016) (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-1 to -19
(2016)). In pertinent part, 2016 Mississippi House Bill No. 1523 section 3 provides:
(1)
The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a religious
organization wholly or partially on the basis that such organization:
(a) Solemnizes or declines to solemnize any marriage, or provides or declines to
provide services, accommodations, facilities, goods or privileges for a purpose
related to the solemnization, formation, celebration or recognition of any marriage,
based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral
conviction . . .
(b) Makes any employment-related decision including, but not limited to, the
decision whether or not to hire, terminate or discipline an individual whose conduct
or religious beliefs are inconsistent with those of the religious organization . . .
(c) Makes any decision concerning the sale, rental, occupancy of, or terms and
conditions of occupying a dwelling or other housing under its control, based upon
or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction
....
(2)
The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a religious
organization that advertises, provides or facilitates adoption or foster care, wholly
or partially on the basis that such organization has provided or declined to provide
any adoption or foster care service, or related service, based upon or in a manner
consistent with a sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction . . . .
(6)
The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a person
wholly or partially on the basis that the person establishes sex-specific standards or
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demonstrated similar disapproval and joined New York by banning statefunded travel to Mississippi.43
Thirteen individuals and two organizations even sued Mississippi in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, arguing
that HB 1523 was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.44 The District Court enjoined Mississippi from enacting or enforcing
HB 1523.45 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed.46 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.47
Executive Orders 155 and 156 are still in effect and still impact
individuals. Last year, students in a New York public university could not
travel to North Carolina using state funds, pursuant to Executive Order 155,
to compete in a National Collegiate Athletic Association competition.48
Those students were placed at a competitive disadvantage as they had to fly
into and stay in a neighboring state to participate in the competition.49 As a
result, the students traveled approximately one hundred miles—from
Roanoke, Virginia to Greensboro, North Carolina—to participate in the
competition.50 This is just one recent example of how New York is causing
economic harm to North Carolina at the expense of New York’s residents.

43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

policies concerning employee or student dress or grooming, or concerning access to
restrooms, spas, baths, showers, dressing rooms, locker rooms, or other intimate
facilities or settings, based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held
religious belief or moral conviction . . . .
(7)
The state government shall not take any discriminatory action against a state
employee wholly or partially on the basis that such employee lawfully speaks or
engages in expressive conduct based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely
held religious belief or moral conviction . . . .
(8)
(a) Any person employed or acting on behalf of the state government who has
authority to authorize or license marriages, including, but not limited to, clerks,
registers of deeds or their deputies, may seek recusal from authorizing or licensing
lawful marriages based upon or in a manner consistent with a sincerely held religious
belief or moral conviction . . .
(b) Any person employed or acting on behalf of the state government who has
authority to perform or solemnize marriages, including, but not limited to, judges,
magistrates, justices of the peace or their deputies, may seek recusal from performing
or solemnizing lawful marriages based upon or in a manner consistent with a
sincerely held religious belief or moral conviction . . . .
Grossman, supra note 37.
Barber v. Bryant, 193 F. Supp. 3d 677, 687–88 (S.D. Miss. 2016).
Id. at 724.
Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 358 (5th Cir. 2017).
Barber v. Bryant, 138 S. Ct. 652 (2018).
See Campbell, supra note 39.
See id.
Barbara O’Brien, North Carolina Bathroom Bill Becomes Issue for SUNY Swimmers, BUFFALO NEWS (Mar.
7, 2019), https://buffalonews.com/2019/03/07/north-carolina-bathroom-bill-becomes-issue-forsuny-swimmers/.
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B. California’s Travel Ban
Effective January 1, 2017, California forbids state agencies, departments,
boards, authorities, or commissions from: (1) requiring employees to travel
to a state that has enacted laws that discriminate on the basis of “sexual
orientation, gender identity, or gender expression” or (2) approving a request
for state-funded or state-sponsored travel to another state that has enacted
laws that discriminate on the basis of “sexual orientation, gender identity, or
gender expression.”51 As previously explained, unlike New York’s travel
bans, California’s Travel Ban was enacted pursuant to a statute: California
Government Code Section 11139.8. California’s Travel Ban is similar to
New York’s travel bans, except it has a much broader geographic reach as it
is not only limited to Indiana, North Carolina, and Mississippi.
California’s Travel Ban requires the California Attorney General to
provide a list of states that have laws52 that discriminate on the basis of
“sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression.”53 Currently, the
list consists of eleven states: Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Texas (the “Banned States”).54 However, this list is subject to change.
51
52

53
54

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017).
Some examples of discriminatory laws have included:
1. Alabama: Alabama’s Governor, Kay Ivey, signed a bill allowing adoption agencies in
Alabama to follow faith-based policies, such as not placing children with gay couples.
ALA. CODE § 26-10D-1 to -7 (2017).
2. Georgia: Georgia wanted to give religious organizations the option to deny services to
LGBTQ members; however, Georgia’s Governor, Nathan Deal, vetoed the bill because
of statewide opposition. See H.B. 153-757, 2d Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2016).
3. Indiana: Indiana’s former Governor, Mike Pence, signed Indiana’s Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, which would “potentially allow businesses to refuse service to any persons
on the basis of sexual orientation, if to do so would offend the religious scruples of the
individual or business.” S.B. 119-101, Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015).
4. Mississippi: Mississippi’s Governor, Phil Bryant, signed the “Protecting Freedom of
Conscience from Government Discrimination Act,” which protects businesses and
religious groups if they deny services like counseling, wedding planning, or adoption
support, to LGBTQ individuals. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-1 to -19 (2017).
5. South Dakota: South Dakota’s senate bill sought “protections to faith-based or religious
child-placement agencies,” which will inevitably discriminate against LGBTQ
individuals. S.B. 92-149 (S.D. 2017).
6. Texas: Texas’s Governor signed a house bill that allowed foster care agencies to deny
adoptions and services to children and parents based on “sincerely held religious beliefs.”
Like South Dakota’s senate bill, this essentially allows Texas’s agencies to discriminate
against children in foster care and potentially disqualify LGBTQ families from the state’s
foster and adoption system. H.B. 85-3859, Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (codified as TEX.
HUMAN RES. CODE ANN. § 45.001– .010).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017).
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF ATT’Y GEN., PROHIBITION ON STATE-FUNDED AND STATESPONSORED TRAVEL TO STATES WITH DISCRIMINATORY LAWS (ASSEMBLY BILL NO. 1887),
https://oag.ca.gov/ab1887 (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
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Like New York’s travel bans55—as well as those of other states—
California’s Travel Ban has several exceptions, some of which allow state
employees to travel to the Banned States in order to litigate a case, meet
contractual obligations incurred before January 1, 2017, or protect the public
health, welfare, or safety of California.56 California’s Travel Ban does not
cite to any federal statute authorizing the ban;57 however, the legislative
history does cite to the Supreme Court case upholding marriage equality for
LGBTQ individuals, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).58
As previously explained, California’s Travel Ban was passed because of
state laws that discriminate against LGBTQ individuals.
These
discriminatory laws were predominantly passed due to the Court’s recent
jurisprudence on religious freedom. The Court has long held that states must
accommodate a person’s free exercise of religion, unless a state has a
compelling interest for not doing so.59 However, in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,60 the Court abandoned the
compelling state interest test and instead held that the Free Exercise Clause
may not be used to challenge neutral laws of general applicability.61 The
United States Congress responded to the Court’s holding in Smith by enacting
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”).62 Under the RFRA,
55

56
57
58

59

60
61
62

See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.144 (2016) (“[U]nless such travel is necessary for the
enforcement of New York State law, to meet prior contractual obligations, or for the protection of
public health, welfare, and safety.”); Id. § 8.155 (“[U]nless such travel is necessary for the
enforcement of New York State law, to meet prior contractual obligations, or for the protection of
public health, welfare, and safety”); Id. § 8.156 (“[U]nless such travel is necessary for the
enforcement of New York State law, to meet prior contractual obligations, or for the protection of
public health, welfare, and safety”).
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017).
This information would support the arguments in Part III.A, infra, but is also worth mentioning
here, in order to provide context for California’s Travel Ban.
See generally CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8; STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887#.
See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406–09 (1963) (using the “compelling state interest” test
to consider whether a state agency could require an employee to work on his or her Sabbath as a
condition of obtaining unemployment benefits); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221–29
(1972) (considering whether a state could require the Amish to unwillingly send their children to
school beyond the eighth grade under a similar standard to the compelling state interest test).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 879–80, 885–88.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012):
(a)
. . . Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection
(b) . . . .
(b)
. . . Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—
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Congress essentially overruled Smith by returning to the compelling state
interest test.63 However, the Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, held that the
RFRA does not apply to the states.64 After the Court’s holding in City of
Boerne, several individual states enacted their own versions of the RFRA.65
Some states that enacted their own versions of the RFRA66 began
discriminating against LGBTQ individuals on religious grounds.67 In
response to such discriminatory laws, California enacted its travel ban.
Based on the legislative history, the rationale for California’s Travel Ban
seems to be twofold: (1) “to prevent the use of state funds to benefit a state
that does not adequately protect the civil rights of certain classes of people”
and (2) “to prevent a state agency from compelling an employee to travel to
an environment in which he or she may feel uncomfortable.”68 The
legislative history acknowledges that state-funded travel affects businesses in
the Banned States because it financially benefits hotels, restaurants, taxicab

63
64
65

66

67

68

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
(c)
. . . A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section
may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or defense under
this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing under article III of the
Constitution.
See id. Thus, the “restoration” in the RFRA title might refer to the restoration of the “compelling
state interest” test that was developed in Sherbert v. Verner and used in Wisconsin v. Yoder.
521 U.S. 507, 533–36 (1997).
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Mar. 12, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (“According to the National Conference of State Legislatures . . . website,
as of late 2015, twenty-one states had enacted some form of . . . RFRA legislation.”).
The constitutionality of these bills and statutes is outside the scope of this Article. For the purpose
of discussion, this Article assumes their validity. Interestingly, some writers argue that California’s
Travel Ban is unconstitutional because it discriminates against Christian-majority states. See, e.g.,
Cheryl K. Chumley, Opinion, California’s Travel Ban -- Targeted at Christians?, WASH. TIMES, June
23, 2017, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/23/californias-travel-ban-targetedchristians/ (describing California’s Travel Ban as “religious discrimination” and
“unconstitutional”).
Some argue that the Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014), which
permitted a for-profit business to deny contraceptive coverage on religious grounds, may have
paved the way for discriminatory laws. See generally Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, Reading Hobby Lobby
in Context, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/10/opinion/lindagreenhouse-reading-hobby-lobby-in-context.html (discussing the implications of the Hobby Lobby
decision); Terrence McCoy, How Hobby Lobby Paved the Way for Indiana’s ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill, WASH.
POST (Mar. 27, 2015, 4:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/
2015/03/27/indianas-religious-freedom-bill-and-the-ghost-of-hobby-lobby/?utm_term=.08da94
a5ae1d (noting the connection between the Hobby Lobby decision and the Indiana bill).
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887#.
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companies, and airlines.69 The legislative history also explains that the
Banned States collect tax revenue associated with those transactions.70
Shortly after California’s Travel Ban was implemented, several states
responded negatively to it.71 California’s Travel Ban remains in effect today,
and its consequences are real, even for public universities in California. For
example, California State University, Fresno received $400,000 from
Mississippi to play a football game there in 2015 and received $1.4 million
to play another game in Alabama.72 San Jose State University, a university
owned by California, received $3.1 million to play two games in Alabama.73
Due to California’s Travel Ban, these arrangements may not be possible in
the future unless California public universities arranged to fund travel to
these states privately.
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S MEANING AND APPLICABILITY
TO STATE-IMPLEMENTED TRAVEL BANS
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Principle Against Extraterritoriality
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes.”74
[A] central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling
the Constitutional Convention [was] the conviction that in order to succeed,
the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.75

69
70
71

72
73
74
75

Id.
Id.
See Patrick McGreevy, Texas Responds to California’s LGBT Travel Ban, Saying Golden State Firms ‘Fleeing
Over Taxation and Regulation,’ L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-201706-htmlstory.html#texas-responds-to-ca
lifornia-lgbt-travel-ban-saying-golden-state-firms-fleeing-over-taxation-and-regulation (showing
examples of criticism from Kentucky: “It is fascinating that the very same West Coast liberals who
rail against the President’s executive order, that protects our nation from foreign terrorists, have
now contrived their own travel ban aimed at punishing states who don’t fall in lockstep with their
far-left political ideology[;]” and Texas: “California may be able to stop their state employees, but
they can’t stop all the businesses that are fleeing over taxation and regulation and relocating to
Texas.”).
Grossman, supra note 37.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979) (citing H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 533–34 (1949)).
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Although the Commerce Clause only addresses the power given to
Congress,76 the Court has long recognized that the Commerce Clause also
limits77 states from enacting statutes that simply affect interstate commerce.78
This limit on state power to legislate is generally referred to as the dormant
commerce clause.79 The rationale for the dormant commerce clause was to:
serve the Commerce Clause’s purpose of preventing a State from retreating
into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole,
as it would do if it were free to place burdens on the flow of commerce across
its borders that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear. 80

Furthermore, the dormant commerce clause is “driven by concern about
economic protectionism” and is designed to prevent state “regulatory
measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening outof-state competitors.”81 In addition, other rationales from unrelated Court
holdings could easily apply to the dormant commerce clause, as Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky has explained: residents from other states should not be
harmed by statutes crafted by legislatures that do not represent them.82
76

77

78

79
80
81
82

See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534–35 (1949) (“The Commerce Clause
is one of the most prolific sources of national power and an equally prolific source of conflict with
legislation of the state. While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states, it does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressional
action, nor how to draw the line between what is and what is not commerce among the states.
Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word, this Court has advanced the solidarity
and prosperity of this Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the
Constitution.”); see also Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326 n.2 (1979) (quoting Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 534–35).
See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995) (holding that the
dormant commerce clause prohibits certain state regulations, “even when Congress has failed to
legislate on the subject”) (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992)); Lewis v.
BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980) (“[T]he Court long has recognized that [the
Commerce Clause] also limits the power of the States to erect barriers against interstate trade.”); S.
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (“[E]ver since Gibbons v. Ogden, [22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1 (1824)], the states have not been deemed to have authority to impede substantially the free flow
of commerce from state to state, or to regulate those phases of the national commerce which,
because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any, be prescribed by
a single authority.”) (footnote omitted).
See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989) (“This Court long has recognized that this
affirmative grant of authority to Congress also encompasses an implicit or ‘dormant’ limitation on
the authority of the States to enact legislation affecting interstate commerce.”) (emphasis added); see
also Hughes, 441 U.S. at 326; Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 534–535.
See, e.g., Healy, 491 U.S. 324.
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 514 U.S. at 179–80.
Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (quotations omitted).
This inference could be drawn by examining McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435–
36 (1819). There, the Court held a Maryland-implemented tax on the Bank of the United States
was unconstitutional, in part because it was a tax that would affect out-of-state residents, lacking
political representation in Maryland. In addition, the Court explained a similar inference in S.C.
Highway Dep’t. v. Barnwell Bros.: “Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in
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Applying these rationales to state-implemented travel bans, it would almost
always be the case that the majority of residents from states that are
negatively impacted by a travel ban did not have meaningful political
representation in the state where the ban was implemented. If those residents
did have meaningful political representation, it is very unlikely that they
would be supportive of a ban that would negatively impact their own state’s
economy.
Embedded in the dormant commerce clause lies the principle against
extraterritoriality.83 Under this principle, state and local laws that have the
extraterritorial effect of regulating “commerce occurring wholly outside the
boundaries of a State” are a clear violation of the dormant commerce clause
and thus are generally struck down “without further inquiry.”84 This rule is
premised on the principles of state sovereignty: “[t]he principles guiding this
assessment . . . reflect the Constitution’s special concern both with the
maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by state-imposed
limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual
States within their respective spheres.”85 The Court further expounded this
point in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: “one State’s power to impose
burdens on the interstate market for automobiles is not only subordinate to
the federal power over interstate commerce but is also constrained by the
need to respect the interests of other States.”86
To demonstrate how the principle against extraterritoriality has been
applied by the Court, consider Edgar v. MITE Corporation87 and Brown-Foreman
Distillers Corporation v. New York State Liquor Authority.88 In Edgar, the Court
found that an Illinois statute violated the dormant commerce clause because
it required the Illinois Secretary of State to approve any takeovers where:
[the target company’s] shareholders located in Illinois own 10% of the class
of equity securities subject to the offer, or for which any two of the following
three conditions are met: the corporation has its principal executive office in

83
84
85
86
87
88

judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon
those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.”
303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 465 (6th ed. 2019).
Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
Id. at 336, 337 n.14 (quoting Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986)).
Id. at 335–36 (footnotes omitted).
517 U.S. 559, 571 (1996) (internal citations omitted).
457 U.S. 624 (1982).
476 U.S. 573 (1986).
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Illinois, is organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated
capital and paid-in surplus represented within the State. 89

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
summarized the possible effects of the Illinois statute: “the [Illinois statute]
granted the Illinois Secretary of State the ability to intervene in transactions
between an out-of-state acquiring company and out-of-state shareholders of
the target company when neither the acquiring company nor the target
company’s shareholders had connections to Illinois.”90 The Court—
emphasizing the statute’s “sweeping extraterritorial effect”—reasoned that if
Illinois may impose such regulations, so may other States; and interstate
commerce in securities transactions generated by tender offers would be
thoroughly stifled.”91
In Brown-Foreman, the Court, relying on Edgar’s principles, held that a
New York statute that “require[d] every liquor distiller or producer that sells
liquor to wholesalers within the State to sell at a price that is no higher than
the lowest price the distiller charges wholesalers anywhere else in the United
States” violated the dormant commerce clause.92 The Court reasoned that
the statute had the “practical effect of . . . control[ling] liquor prices in other
States.”93 Further, the Court explained that: “[w]hile New York may
regulate the sale of liquor within its borders, and may seek low prices for its
residents, it may not project its legislation into other States by regulating the
price to be paid for liquor in those States.”94
Edgar and Brown-Foreman both stand for the proposition that a state may
not seek to regulate commercial activity outside of its borders, i.e., the
prohibition of extraterritoriality. If we apply this proposition to stateimplemented travel bans, such bans do precisely that: attempt to regulate
economic or commercial activity outside states’ own borders to achieve a
desired result. To bring this into context, consider California’s Travel Ban.95
Just as Illinois may have wanted to protect target companies with ties to
Illinois from unfair takeovers, and just as New York may have wanted to
protect its consumers from inflation of liquor prices, California may have
wanted to protect its employees from discrimination in the Banned States.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 627, 641–43 (1982).
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 668 (4th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642.
Brown-Foreman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 575, 582 (1986).
Id. at 583 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 582–83 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017).
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However, by protecting their companies, consumers, and employees, all
three states ended up regulating commerce outside of their state: Illinois
regulated the sale of stock outside its state, New York regulated the price of
liquor outside its state, and California is seeking to regulate commercial
activity outside its state. California sought to regulate commercial activity
outside its state by boycotting goods and services in the Banned States,
hoping to coerce those states to adopt a political agenda consistent with
California’s.96 The best way California could do this is by precluding
California employees from traveling to the Banned States, thereby
preventing its employees from spending money on goods and services there.97
Absent California’s Travel Ban, California employees would be able to use
California funds in the Banned States to purchase goods and services (like
food, beverages, hotel rooms, and taxicabs).
Any state-implemented travel ban, regardless of its stated purpose, would
most likely affect98 interstate commerce because state-funded travel bans (or
96

97

98

See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Mar. 12, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (“Is preventing travel to other states, and the accompanying interactions
with the residents of those states, the best way to encourage those states to change their laws?”).
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=20
1520160AB1887# (“If the premise of this bill is that state funds should not be spent in states that
discriminate against [LGBTQ] persons, why would California ban state-funded travel but still
spend a presumably much greater amount on procuring goods from that same state? If the purpose
of the bill is truly to have a meaningful economic compact . . . State-funded travel benefits hotels,
restaurants, taxicab companies, and airlines more than it benefits the state, with the state reaping
only the tax revenues associated with those activates. So both large and small expenditures affect
the businesses operating within those states, and only secondarily affect the state governments by
the tax revenue that the business activities create.”); STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON
JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. Mar. 12, 2016), https://legi
nfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887# (“Is preventing
travel to other states, and the accompanying interactions with the residents of those states, the best
way to encourage those states to change their laws?”); see also Jennifer L. Dauer, Political Boycotts:
Protected by the Political Action Exception to Antitrust Liability or Illegal Per Se?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1273,
1284 (1995) (“Boycotts always or almost always unreasonably restrain competition. Therefore,
courts have found boycotts to be per se illegal under antitrust statutes.”) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 78. But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995)
(stating that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, has broad authority to regulate: (1) “the use
of the channels of interstate commerce,” (2) “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities,” and (3) “those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce . . .
[including] those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce”). Regarding the third
category (activities that substantially affect interstate commerce), the Court admitted that “case law
ha[d] not been clear whether an activity must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate commerce
in order to be within Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 559.
However, in Lopez the Court clarified that activities must substantially affect interstate commerce in
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boycotts)99 must cause some sort of negative economic impact to be
successful.100 Without such impact, the ban will not be effective, especially if
the purpose of the ban is to coerce a political change in another state.
Applying this reasoning to California’s Travel Ban, it is clear that the statute
affects interstate commerce because it was designed to chill interstate travel,
negatively impacting the Banned States’ economies and businesses.101 This
inference is supported by the legislative history of California’s Travel Ban.102
There, California’s Department of General Services found that there were
more than 10,000 instances of out-of-state travel in 2015 alone.103 This
shows that California carefully designed its statute to respond to a known
economic impact. While, theoretically, it is possible that very little of that

99

100
101

102

103

order for Congress to regulate those activities. Id. The distinction between Lopez and Healy, supra
note 25, is that Lopez focuses on Congress’s authority to regulate interstate commerce, whereas Healy
focuses on the limitations on states to refrain from regulating interstate commerce. In the former
context, the Constitution permits Congress to legislate when a certain activity “substantially affects”
interstate commerce; however, in the latter context, the Constitution prevents states from enacting
statutes that merely “affect” interstate commerce. Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 with Healy, 491
U.S. at 326 n.1. Thus, this Article will apply the test articulated in Healy and will not confuse it
with the test articulated in Lopez. Furthermore, even if Lopez were the applicable test for the
dormant commerce clause, the analysis of this Article would not change because state-implemented
travel bans are intended to substantially affect interstate commerce, or they would not be effective.
A boycott and a state-implemented travel ban are functionally interchangeable because both are
designed to achieve a “social or economic isolation.” See infra text accompanying note 100 (defining
boycott).
Boycott, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“An action designed to achieve the social or
economic isolation of an adversary, esp. by the concerted refusal to do business with it.”).
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (“State-funded travel benefits hotels, restaurants, taxicab companies, and
airlines more than it benefits the state, with the state reaping only the tax revenues associated with
those activates. Thus, both large and small expenditures affect the businesses operating within
those states, and only secondarily affect the state governments by the tax revenue that the business
activities create.”); see also STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF
ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. Mar. 12, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/
billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887# (“Is preventing travel to other states, and the
accompanying interactions with the residents of those states, the best way to encourage those states
to change their laws?”).
See generally STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 6871887 (Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887#.
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (“According to a preliminary response from the Department of General
Services (DGS), however, many agencies, especially in the executive branch, occasionally send
employees to other states. For example, according to DGS, there were over 10,000 ‘out-of-state
person trips’ in 2015.”).
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out-of-state travel was to the Banned States, or that 2015 saw an unusually
high amount of travel, there is no evidence to support either claim.
In short, Illinois, New York, and California’s laws all have one thing in
common: each state is in some way influencing commerce in another state.
However, compared to Illinois’s law in Edgar and New York’s law in BrownForeman, California’s law is much more extreme because, not only has
California imposed an impediment to some forms of interstate commerce, it
is banning them entirely (as opposed to restricting like Illinois and New York
did). To further illustrate that California’s Travel Ban fits neatly into the
principle against extraterritoriality, consider Air Transport Association of America
v. City & County of San Francisco.104
In Air Transport, the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California found parts of a city ordinance that prevented the City of San
Francisco from contracting with companies whose employee benefit plans
discriminated between employees with spouses and employees with domestic
partners (among other groups) violated the principle against extraterritoriality.105 In relevant part, the ordinance’s nondiscrimination requirements
applied to “any of a contractor’s operations elsewhere in the United
States.”106 Applying the standards from Brown-Foreman, the District Court
found that a company that signs a contract with the City of San Francisco,
“cannot provide discriminatory benefit packages to its employees anywhere
in the United States without facing penalties imposed by the City [of San
Francisco].
In other words, the City effectively regulates certain
extraterritorial practices of City contractors.”107 The District Court found
that the extraterritorial portion of the ordinance—regulating “any of a
contractor’s operations elsewhere in the United States”—violated the
dormant commerce clause.108 Although the City of San Francisco appealed
other parts of the District Court’s ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, it did not appeal the District Court’s
extraterritoriality ruling.109 Applying the District Court’s analysis in Air
Transport to state-implemented travel bans, the result is the same: stateimplemented travel bans regulate commercial conduct in other states by

104
105
106
107
108
109

Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
Id. at 1162–64.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1162.
Id. at 1157, 1162–64.
Air Transp. Ass'n of Am. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 266 F.3d 1064, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001).
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precluding individuals from purchasing goods and services there until those
states change their laws.
B. The Test for Invalidating State Statutes Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
Although the Court’s current jurisprudence is clear that the dormant
commerce clause is triggered when states enact statutes that affect110
interstate commerce, the Court did not always have the same test for
invalidating state statutes that affect interstate commerce.111 The modern
approach for analyzing the dormant commerce clause—best explained in
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona—is a balancing test, where the burdens on
interstate commerce may not be greater than the benefits to a state.112 The
Court explained that the weight of the balancing depends on whether a state
statute is facially discriminatory or facially neutral.113 The difference
between a facially neutral state statute and facially discriminatory state
statute is discussed below.
1. Defining Facially Neutral State Statutes
Facially neutral state statutes treat their residents and other states’
residents alike (in other words, they regulate evenhandedly), although they
may still affect interstate commerce.114 Facially neutral state statutes only
violate the dormant commerce clause if “the burdens they impose on
interstate trade are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.’”115 This balancing test is illustrated well by Hunt v. Washington
110
111
112
113

114
115

See supra text accompanying note 78 and note 98.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 471 (6th ed. 2019)
325 U.S. 761, 783–84 (1945).
City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978); see also United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 331 (2007) (“To determine whether a
law violates the dormant Commerce Clause, the Court first asks whether it discriminates on its face
against interstate commerce.”).
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 98–99 (1994).
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142
(1970)). However, some Supreme Court justices argue that when a state statute is facially neutral,
courts should not even apply a balancing test; instead, courts should simply uphold it. See, e.g.,
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted) (“This process is ordinarily called ‘balancing,’ but the scale analogy is not really
appropriate, since the interests on both sides are incommensurate. It is more like judging whether
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy . . . . Weighing the governmental interests
of a State against the needs of interstate commerce is, by contrast, a task squarely within the
responsibility of Congress, and ‘ill-suited to the judicial function.’ I would therefore abandon the
‘balancing’ approach to these [dormant commerce clause cases] . . . and leave essentially legislative
judgements to the Congress.”). Scholars have also considered similar views. See, e.g., Donald H.
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State Apple Advertising Commission.116
In Hunt, the Court struck down a North Carolina statute—N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 106-189.1 (1973)—requiring all apples sold or shipped into North
Carolina to be “no grade other than the applicable [U.S.D.A.] grade or
standard.”117 Pursuant to North Carolina’s statute, “[s]tate grades were
expressly prohibited.”118 Although North Carolina’s statute was facially
neutral (because it applied to all apples sold in the state, regardless of where
the apples were grown or shipped from),119 the statute had a discriminatory
effect on the sale of Washington state apples because Washington—the
nation’s largest producer of apples—used a different and more stringent
grading system than the U.S.D.A.120 The Court acknowledged that North
Carolina’s statute was facially neutral, but still held that North Carolina’s
statute was unduly burdensome to interstate commerce, and more
specifically to the sale of Washington apples.121
Unlike North Carolina’s statute in Hunt, state-implemented travel bans
cannot be facially neutral because they must articulate which states
specifically are being banned. Even if a state-implemented travel ban were
applied to every other state, it would still not be facially neutral because
businesses in forty-nine states would be treated differently than in-state
businesses. Accordingly, California’s Travel Ban is not facially neutral

116
117
118
119
120
121

Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH.
L. REV. 1091 (1986) (stating that “[d]espite what the Court has said, it has not been balancing”);
Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis
in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985) (noting that although the Court has
articulated a balancing test, the Court “actually is following a very different line of analysis”); Mark
Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125 (1979) (arguing that the
revival of the notion of substantive due process in relation to the commerce clause is “crucial in
light of the fact that the Court has already unknowingly introduced efficiency concerns into its
analysis under inappropriate labels that obscure the meaning of what it has done”).
432 U.S. 333 (1977).
Id. at 335, 354.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 352.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 350–52 (providing three reasons why North Carolina’s statute was unduly burdensome: (1)
“the statute’s consequence of raising the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for
Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of their North Carolina counterparts
unaffected;” (2) “the statute has the effect of stripping away from the Washington apple industry
the competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its expensive inspection
and grading system;” and (3) “by prohibiting Washington growers and dealers from marketing
applies under their State’s grades, the statute has a leveling effect which insidiously operates to the
advantage of local apple producers.”).
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because the California Attorney General has listed eleven states on its travel
ban website.122
2. Defining Facially Discriminatory State Statutes
State statutes that expressly draw a distinction between residents within
their jurisdiction and residents outside their jurisdiction are facially
discriminatory.123 To illustrate, consider Hughes v. Oklahoma124 and Maine v.
Taylor.125
In Hughes, the Court held that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the
transportation of Oklahoma minnows outside state lines was facially
discriminatory and thus “repugnant to the Commerce Clause.”126 There,
Oklahoma, in order to preserve minnows within its borders, implemented
title 29, section 4-115(B) of the Oklahoma Statutes: “[no] person may
transport or ship minnows for sale outside the state which were seined or
procured within the waters of this state.”127 The Court first explained that
the statute was subject to a Commerce Clause challenge because it involved
exporting natural resources.128 The Court then explained that the statute
was facially discriminatory because it “forbids the transportation of natural
minnows out of the State for purposes of sale, and thus ‘overtly blocks the
flow of interstate commerce at [the] State’s borders.’”129 The Court was not
convinced by Oklahoma’s reasoning for enacting its statute: “maintaining
the ecological balance in state waters by avoiding the removal of inordinate
numbers of minnows.”130 The Court explained:
Far from choosing the least discriminatory alternative, Oklahoma has
chosen to “conserve” its minnows in the way that most overtly discriminates
against interstate commerce. The State places no limits on the numbers of
minnows that can be taken by licensed minnow dealers; nor does it limit in
any way how these minnows may be disposed of within the State. Yet it
forbids the transportation of any commercially significant number of natural
minnows out of the State for sale. Section 4–115(B) is certainly not a “last
ditch” attempt at conservation after nondiscriminatory alternatives have
proved unfeasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory means

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

See supra text accompanying note 54.
Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984).
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
477 U.S. 131 (1986).
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 336–38 (1979).
Id. at 323.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 337.
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even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the
State’s purported legitimate local purpose more effectively. 131

Thus, the Court struck down Oklahoma’s statute.132
In Taylor, the Court held that a Maine statute banning the importation of
live baitfish into its state was facially discriminatory, but—unlike Hughes—
was constitutional.133 There, the State of Maine, fearing that live baitfish
would carry parasites that would harm its unique aquatic ecology,134 enacted
title 12, section 7613 of the Maine Revised Statutes: “[a] person is guilty of
importing live bait if he imports into this State any live fish, including smelts,
which are commonly used for bait fishing in inland waters.”135 The Court
first explained that the statute was subject to a Commerce Clause challenge
because it “restricts interstate trade.”136 The Court then explained that the
statute was facially discriminatory because, “in the most direct manner
possible,” Maine was blocking all inward shipments of live baitfish from every
other state, at Maine’s border.137
Like the state laws in Hughes and Taylor, state-implemented travel bans
are facially discriminatory because a state cannot possibly have a travel ban
against other states without first indicating which states are included in the
ban. Applying this reasoning to New York’s and California’s travel bans,
those bans identify specific states that New York and California employees
are not permitted to travel to using state funds, thus California and New York
are facially discriminating against out-of-state interests.138
Facially discriminatory state statutes, like the ones in Hughes and Taylor,
are generally unconstitutional because they are repugnant to the dormant
commerce clause.139 However, facially discriminatory state statutes may
nevertheless be upheld if: (1) Congress authorized them, (2) they serve a
state’s legitimate local purpose, or (3) the state is acting as a market
participant. These three exceptions are discussed in Part III, below.
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138

139

Id. at 337–38 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 338.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38, 140 (1986).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 132 n.1.
Id. at 137.
Id.
For a list of the states to which California has explicitly banned state-funded travel, see supra text
accompanying note 54. For a list of the states to which New York has explicitly banned statefunded travel, see supra text accompanying note 2.
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)) (“State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face ‘a virtually per se
rule of invalidity.’”).
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III. EXCEPTIONS TO FACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY STATE STATUTES
A. Congressional Authorization
Congress has the authority to redefine the distribution of power over
interstate commerce.140 “Congress may ‘redefine the distribution of power
over interstate commerce’ by ‘permit[ting] the states to regulate the
commerce in a manner which would otherwise not be permissible.’”141
However, if Congress allows individual states to enact laws that regulate
interstate commerce, such authorization must be “unmistakably clear.”142
By examining California’s Travel Ban and its legislative history, it is clear
that the statute does not have congressional authorization because neither
the statute, nor the legislative history, cite to any federal authorization.143
The only cited federal authority is a brief discussion of Obergefell v. Hodges,144
a Supreme Court case upholding marriage equality for LGBTQ individuals.
In Obergefell, the Court did not interpret a federal statute in a way that would
authorize these travel bans. There is no indication that Congress even
considered the issue, and consequently it is unlikely that the Court would
have opined such an authorization would be proper.145 Although
California—along with the many other states that implemented similar travel
bans—believes that it is a “national leader on behalf of LGBTQ
communities,” and that “action must be taken to recognize that
discriminatory laws are unacceptable anywhere in the nation,”146 Congress
did not grant California the authority to prohibit other states from
discriminating against LGBTQ individuals. Nor did Congress grant such
authority to Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, Vermont, Washington, or
the District of Columbia. Like California, all other states and territories that
enacted similar travel bans do not cite any sort of congressional
authorization.

140
141
142
143

144
145
146

S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87–88 (1984) (quoting S. Pac. Co., 325
U.S. at 769).
South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91.
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017); STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY,
ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887#.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
See generally id.
STATE OF CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. June 27,
2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB18
87#.
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Realistically, it is very unlikely that Congress will delegate federal antidiscrimination laws to any given state—or a group of specified states. It is
equally unlikely that Congress will authorize states to enact legislation in an
attempt to cut economic ties with one another because of differing political
views. Thus, there is no, and likely will never be, congressional authorization
to enact state-implemented travel bans.
B. Legitimate Local Purpose
“The limitation imposed by the Commerce Clause on state regulatory
power ‘is by no means absolute,’ and ‘the States retain authority under their
general police powers to regulate matters of legitimate local concern, even
though interstate commerce may be affected.’”147
Facially discriminatory state statutes may be upheld if: (1) a state
demonstrates that the regulation serves a “legitimate local purpose” and (2)
the local purpose could not be achieved by other available nondiscriminatory
means.148 “At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of
nondiscriminatory alternatives.”149
Recall Maine v. Taylor, from Part II.B.2, where the Court held that
Maine’s baitfish statute was facially discriminatory.150 There, Robert J.
Taylor operated a bait business in the state of Maine.151 Although Maine
statutorily prohibited the importation of live baitfish, Taylor entered into an
agreement to have 158,000 live baitfish delivered to him from another
state.152 Maine indicted Taylor for violating its statute.153 Taylor moved to
dismiss the indictment, arguing that Maine’s statute unconstitutionally
burdened interstate commerce.154
The Court first affirmed the District Court’s finding that Maine’s statute
served a legitimate local purpose because it protected Maine’s fragile aquatic
ecology.155 The Court also affirmed the District Court’s finding that there
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lewis v. BT
Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980)).
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
Id. at 337.
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 142–43, 151–52; see also id. at 140–41 (“[L]ive baitfish imported into [Maine] posed two
significant threats to Maine’s unique and fragile fisheries. First, Maine’s population of wild fish—
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were no available nondiscriminatory means to protect Maine’s fragile
aquatic ecology because “testing procedures for baitfish parasites had not yet
been devised[, and even] if procedures of this sort could be effective, . . . their
development probably would take a considerable amount of time.”156 For
these reasons, the Court concluded that Maine had a legitimate local purpose
to protect its fragile aquatic ecology and there were no other
nondiscriminatory means to serve that purpose.157
Because it is very likely that state-implemented travel bans are facially
discriminatory,158 they must comport with the test articulated in Maine v.
Taylor to fit neatly in the “legitimate local purpose” exception. Stateimplemented travel bans do not satisfy the Taylor test because prohibiting
interstate commerce for essentially punitive reasons does not in any way serve
a legitimate local purpose. To illustrate, consider applying California’s
Travel Ban to the Taylor test. This Article intentionally relies heavily on the
Taylor test when assessing state-implemented travel bans because Maine v.
Taylor was “one of the rare cases where discrimination against out-of-staters
was allowed” and where “out-of-staters were denied access to a state’s
market.”159
The legislative history of California’s Travel Ban provides two reasons
for enacting the statute: (1) “to prevent the use of state funds to benefit a state
that does not adequately protect the civil rights of certain classes of people”
and (2) “to prevent a state agency from compelling an employee to travel to
an environment in which he or she may feel uncomfortable.”160 New York’s
executive orders shared the same two concerns, albeit articulated slightly
differently.161 By way of example, for the North Carolina travel ban, New

156
157
158
159
160

161

including its own indigenous golden shiners—would be placed at risk by three types of parasites
prevalent in out-of-state baitfish, but not common to wild fish in Maine. Second, nonnative species
inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could disturb Maine’s aquatic ecology to an
unpredictable extent by competing with native fish for food or habitat, by preying on native species,
or by disrupting the environment in more subtle ways.”) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Id. at 143 (citation omitted).
Id. at 151–52.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 472 (5th ed.
2015).
STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal.
Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=20152016
0AB1887#.
See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.144 (2015) (providing two, among other, reasons for
enacting the Indiana travel ban: (1) “protecting New York State from inadvertently financing
discrimination against [LGBTQ] people is a compelling state sanctioned government interest” and
(2) “protecting the civil rights and liberties of lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, and transgender [LGBTQ]
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York Executive Order 155 articulated similar concerns as California: (1)
“protecting New York State from inadvertently financing discrimination
against protected classes, including sexual orientation and gender identity, is
a compelling state sanctioned government interest” and (2) “ensuring that
persons are free from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity is a compelling state sanctioned government interest.”162 This
Article solely examines California’s Travel Ban under the Taylor test as
California’s Travel Ban—being a statute as opposed to an executive order—
contains extensive legislative history. Because California articulated two
main reasons for enacting its statute, below are two separate discussions
applying the Taylor test to each.
1. California’s First Reason for Enacting its Statute
The primary reason163 for enacting California’s Travel Ban was “to
prevent the use of state funds to benefit a state that does not adequately

162
163

persons is a compelling state sanctioned government interest”); id. § 8.155 (providing two, among
other, reasons for enacting the North Carolina travel ban: (1) “protecting New York State from
inadvertently financing discrimination against protected classes, including sexual orientation and
gender identity, is a compelling state sanctioned government interest” and (2) “ensuring that
persons are free from discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is a compelling
state sanctioned government interest”); id. § 8.156 (providing two, among other, reasons for
enacting the Mississippi travel ban: (1) “protecting New York State from inadvertently financing
discrimination against [LGBTQ] persons is a compelling state sanctioned government interest”
and (2) “in a free society the equal rights of all citizens, including [LGBTQ] citizens, must be
protected and cherished”).
See id. § 8.155 (prohibiting state-funded or state-sponsored travel to North Carolina).
The reason why the first justification is referred to as the primary reason is because the California
statute’s preamble fails to mention how the statute would protect LGBTQ employees in other states;
instead, it focuses on how to financially harm other states with different civil rights laws. See CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 11139.8 (West 2017) (“The Legislature finds and declares all of the following: (1)
California is a leader in protecting civil rights and preventing discrimination. (2) California’s robust
nondiscrimination laws include protections on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and
gender expression, among other characteristics. (3) Religious freedom is a cornerstone of law and
public policy in the United States, and the Legislature strongly supports and affirms this important
freedom. (4) The exercise of religious freedom should not be a justification for discrimination. (5)
California must take action to avoid supporting or financing discrimination against lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender people.”). Furthermore, several assembly bills explain that: “AB 1887
will send a strong message to states with laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,
gender identity, or gender expression that such laws are not acceptable to the State of California.
By banning state-funded travel to such states, it sends a signal that we do not tolerate discrimination
in our state and beyond our borders.” STATE OF CAL. S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL ORG.,
ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. June 13, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/
faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887#; see also STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY
COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. Mar. 12, 2016),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1887#
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protect the civil rights of certain classes of people.”164 Applying the first part
of the Taylor test, there does not seem to be a legitimate local purpose because
punishing other states for not “adequately” protecting their residents’ civil
rights only benefits individuals physically located within the Banned States’
jurisdictions, not within California’s. Although it may be true that California
employees who travel to the Banned States may benefit from antidiscrimination laws in those states, there is always the possibility for California
residents to travel to other states. That does not render what happens within
those states a matter of legitimate local concern to California. Otherwise,
the mere existence of interstate travel could legitimize practically any
legislation targeting another state. Thus, coercing other states to change
their civil rights laws,165 or any other political reform, does not serve a
legitimate local purpose.
To the contrary, the mechanism by which California—as well as
Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, Vermont, Washington, and the District
of Columbia—enacted its travel ban, banning state-funded travel to specified
states, may actually cause greater harm to LGBTQ individuals and LGBTQowned businesses located within the Banned States. For example, if an
LGBTQ individual and activist owns several restaurants located in a liberal
city in a conservative state and if California cancels an event located near
those restaurants, then that individual may lose business support from
individuals flying in from California. This is best evidenced by an exchange
between the Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky and California’s Attorney
General. The Mayor of Louisville sought an exemption for Louisville—a
city that supports inclusiveness—from California’s Attorney General.166
California’s Attorney General declined, explaining that California’s Travel
Ban did not permit any exceptions to cities within the Banned States.167

164

165

166
167

(“California, a leader in preventing discrimination against the [LGBTQ] community, should not
support [discrimination in] such states. California’s . . . Civil Rights Act prohibits all businesses
establishments ‘of any kind whatsoever’ from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation,
gender identity, and gender expression. Given the values expressed in California law, the author
and sponsors believe it would be inappropriate to allow state funds to support states with
discriminatory laws that are contrary to those codified values.”). Tellingly, neither the assembly
bills nor the statute extensively discusses the second reason for California’s Travel Ban.
STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal.
Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=20152016
0AB1887#.
See id. (“North Carolina adopted a law that effectively overturned local ordinances prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of gender identity and gender expression. . . . Indiana amended its law
in response to such business pressure.”).
See Beitsch, supra note 3.
Id.
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Furthermore, some critics of California’s Travel Ban even argue that
inflicting California’s beliefs on conservative states does nothing more than
exacerbate political divisions rather than protect LGBTQ interests.168
Notwithstanding these concerns, the first part of the Taylor test is not
satisfied—if anything, the opposite is achieved as argued by California’s
Travel Ban’s critics. Thus, it is unnecessary to discuss the second part of the
Taylor test.
2. California’s Second Reason for Enacting its Statute
The second reason why California enacted its statute was “to prevent a
state agency from compelling an employee to travel to an environment in
which he or she may feel uncomfortable.”169 Applying the first part of the
Taylor test, there does seem to be a legitimate local purpose: ensuring
California employees feel safe and comfortable during their employment by
the State of California. However, California fails the second part of the
Taylor test.
To satisfy the second part of the Taylor test, California must show that
there are no other available nondiscriminatory alternatives to achieve its
local purpose. California—as well as Connecticut, Minnesota, New York,
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia—would most likely fail
the second part of the Taylor test because California could protect its
employees without facially discriminating against other states. For example,
California could easily adopt a policy where state employees have the choice,
without any penalties, to travel to states that discriminate against LGBTQ
individuals (the “Proposed Policy”). If California adopts the Proposed Policy,
California would protect its legitimate local concerns in the least
discriminatory way possible because rather than discriminating against
specified states, California could simply make travel to them optional at the
discretion of each employee. The Proposed Policy would certainly not be
unreasonably burdensome to California as the Court in Taylor explained
that: “[a] State must make reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free
flow of commerce across its borders, but it is not required to develop new
and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost.”170 Moreover,
giving employees the choice to travel will cost California a negligible amount

168
169

170

See O’Donnell, supra note 37.
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=2015
20160AB1887#.
See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986)
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of money, if any, because all that California would have to do is provide a
disclaimer to its employees stating that travel to the Banned States is
completely optional.
Perhaps California could argue that giving LGBTQ employees the
choice is not a practical alternative because it would give some employees an
unfair advantage over others. Consequently, the unfair advantage could
compel LGBTQ employees to travel to states that discriminate against them.
Thus, California might argue that its statute is the least discriminatory way
of achieving its local purpose of protecting its employees. However, this
argument would not carry much weight under Taylor.
In Taylor, the District Court struggled to determine whether a
nondiscriminatory alternative was available. Maine argued that “there was
no satisfactory way to inspect shipments of live baitfish for parasites or
commingled species . . . [because] the small size of baitfish and the large
quantities in which they are shipped made inspection for commingled species
‘a physical impossibility.’”171 Thus, Maine argued that there were no available
alternative means to serve Maine’s local concerns.172 Although Taylor
conceded that no scientific technique existed for inspecting live baitfish,173
Taylor speculated that experts could easily develop one.174 However, the
possibility of developing inspection techniques was not Taylor’s central
argument; instead, his central argument was that Maine’s statute was
pointless because live baitfish did not pose a significant threat to Maine’s
aquatic ecology.175
The Court rejected Taylor’s arguments and explained that the “‘abstract
possibility,’ of developing acceptable testing procedures, particularly when

171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 142, 147.
Id. at 147. However, Taylor failed to provide estimates of the time and expense that would be
involved with the development of the testing procedures. Id.
See id. at 142 (“[Taylor] testified that none of the three parasites discussed by the prosecution
witnesses posed any significant threat to fish in the wild, and that sampling techniques had not been
developed for baitfish precisely because there was no need for them. He further testified that
professional baitfish farmers raise their fish in ponds that have been freshly drained to ensure that
no other species is inadvertently collected.”). See also id. at 146 (“Two prosecution witnesses testified
to the lack of [scientifically accepted techniques exist for the sampling and inspection of live
baitfish], and [Taylor’s] expert conceded the point, although [Taylor] disagreed about the need for
such tests.”).
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there is no assurance as to their effectiveness, does not make those procedures
an ‘[a]vailabl[e] . . . nondiscriminatory alternativ[e].’”176
Unlike Taylor, an individual who might challenge California’s Travel
Ban will not have to face the same hurdle as he or she could point to an
available nondiscriminatory alternative that is something more than an
“abstract possibility,” i.e., the Proposed Policy. In other words, instead of
arguing that California’s Travel Ban is pointless, an individual challenging
California’s Travel Ban could persuasively argue that a nondiscriminatory
alternative exists: giving California employees the choice to travel.
In response, California could argue that the Proposed Policy is precisely
what the Court meant when it stated that the “abstract possibility” of other
alternatives, with “no assurance as to their effectiveness,”177 does not
establish an available nondiscriminatory alternative. In response to this
counter, one could argue that California has not178 provided any basis in its
legislative history explaining how or why its statute would effectively prevent
its employees from being discriminated against—neither has Connecticut,
Minnesota, New York, Vermont, Washington, nor the District of Columbia.
In fact, California did not even cite to one instance where one of its
employees was discriminated against in any of the Banned States.
Furthermore, California did not provide statistics demonstrating how many
of its employees are LGBTQ or how many of those LGBTQ employees have
traveled to Banned States using California funds. Thus, because California’s
actual harm is so uncertain, pointing to alternatives that are equally effective
may not be possible. This uncertainty could be blamed entirely on California
because it failed to explain what would be effective to prevent out-of-state
discrimination and California, unlike Maine, did not face similar unknown
circumstances.

176

177
178

See id. at 147 (citations omitted) (“More importantly, we agree with the District Court that the
‘abstract possibility,’ of developing acceptable testing procedures, particularly when there is no
assurance as to their effectiveness, does not make those procedures an ‘[a]vailabl[e] . . .
nondiscriminatory alternativ[e]’ for purposes of the Commerce Clause. A State must make
reasonable efforts to avoid restraining the free flow of commerce across its borders, but it is not
required to develop new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost. Appellee, of
course, is free to work on his own or in conjunction with other bait dealers to develop scientifically
acceptable sampling and inspection procedures for [baitfish]; if and when such procedures are
developed, Maine no longer may be able to justify its import ban. The State need not join in those
efforts, however, and it need not pretend they already have succeeded.”).
Id.
Perhaps if California were sued over this statute, it would provide more information about its
employees and how its statute would protect them.
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One of Maine’s successful arguments was that “nonnative species
inadvertently included in shipments of live baitfish could disturb Maine’s
aquatic ecology to an unpredictable extent by competing with native fish for
food or habitat, by preying on native species, or by disrupting the
environment in more subtle ways.”179 Thus, Maine was concerned with the
uncertainty of what live baitfish could do to its fragile aquatic ecology.180
California does not face similar unknown circumstances.
Maine’s statute was reasonable under the circumstances because Maine
was confronted with a so-called black swan risk.181 A black swan risk is a
metaphor that describes a rare or hard-to-predict event that causes
catastrophic consequences.182 Because Maine’s statute was addressing
unknown circumstances that could result in catastrophic consequences,
Maine’s proactive approach was appropriate. On the other hand, because
California could research, report, and respond to instances of out-of-state
discrimination, a reactive approach may be appropriate. Unlike Maine,
California will not be faced with a catastrophic phenomenon if one of its
employees faces discrimination in the Banned States. Thus, California’s
interests are not commensurate with Maine’s interests because the former
has the luxury of responding reactively, while the latter did not, and the same
could be said of Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, Vermont, Washington,
and the District of Columbia.
Finally, Taylor is clear that when a state statute facially discriminates, the
burden is on the state to demonstrate that its interest cannot be achieved
absent the discrimination.183 This would be a very difficult thing for

179
180

181
182
183

Taylor, 477 U.S. at 141.
See id. at 148 (“[W]e agree with the District Court that Maine has a legitimate interest in guarding
against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility that they may ultimately
prove to be negligible.”).
Although the Court does not explicitly state that Maine was subject to a black swan risk, the facts
suggest that Maine’s statute was addressing such a risk.
See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
(2d ed. 2010).
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138 (“[O]nce a state law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce
‘either on its face or in practical effect,’ the burden falls on the State to demonstrate both that the
statute ‘serves a legitimate local purpose,’ and that this purpose could not be served as well by
available nondiscriminatory means.”). See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
957 (1982) (“The State therefore bears the initial burden of demonstrating a close fit between the
reciprocity requirement and its asserted local purpose.”); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977) (”When discrimination against commerce of the type we have
found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits
flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to
preserve the local interests at stake.”); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (“Our
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California to do because, after reviewing its legislative history, the whole
point of the statute was to economically harm the Banned States,184 and
California was just using its employees as a medium to achieve that goal.185
Perhaps that is why the legislative history does not cite statistics reporting
how many LGBTQ employees work for the state or how many instances of
discrimination those employees faced in the Banned States. Interestingly,
the legislative history does cite statistics concerning the economic impact
interstate travel has on other states.186 Thus, for the foregoing reasons, it is
also unlikely that the second stated purpose of California’s Travel Ban would
withstand scrutiny under the Taylor test.
C. Market Participant
If a state or city acts as a market participant, rather than a market
regulator, then the dormant commerce clause does not apply.187 “Nothing
in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.”188
In White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., the Court held
that an executive order of the Mayor of Boston requiring all construction
projects funded by the city to employ at least 50% city residents did not

184

185

186

187
188

issue then is whether the discrimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can be justified in view
of the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting them.”).
See supra text accompanying note 163. However, it could also be argued that California’s Travel
Ban is a symbolic action, intended to signal that California does not want discriminatory laws passed
in other states. Although the Court may be sympathetic to California, it is very unlikely that the
symbolic message would trump the Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.
See STATE OF CAL. S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL ORG., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 6871887 (Cal. June 13, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (stating, under the “purpose of the bill,” that “[the legislation] will send a
strong message to states with laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, gender
identity, or gender expression that such laws are not acceptable to the State of California. By
banning state-funded travel to such states, it sends a signal that we do not tolerate discrimination in
our state and beyond our borders.”).
See STATE OF CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887
(Cal. Apr. 1, 2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id
=201520160AB1887# (“According to a preliminary response form the Department of General
Services (DGS), however, many agencies, especially in the executive branch, occasionally send
employees to other states. For example, according to DGS, there were over 10,000 ‘out-of-state
persons trips’ in 2015. . . . If the premise of this bill is that state funds should not be spent in states
that discriminate against [LGBTQ] persons, why would California ban state-funded travel but still
spend a presumably much greater amount on procuring goods from that same state?”).
White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 207 (1983).
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
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violate the dormant commerce clause.189 There, Boston’s Mayor required
all construction projects, funded wholly or in part by city funds or city
administered funds, to be performed by “a work force consisting of at least
half bona fide residents of Boston.”190 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts found that the executive order swept too broadly because it
had a significant impact on out-of-state workers.191 However, the Court
reversed and upheld the executive order, finding that the order did not have
a significant impact on out-of-state workers and did not create more of a
burden than necessary to achieve its objectives.192 However, the Court did
limit what states can do, such that they cannot “impose restrictions that reach
beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts
business.”193 The Court further explained that “the mayor’s executive order
covers a discrete, identifiable class of economic activity in which the city is a
major participant. Everyone affected by the order is, in a substantial if
informal sense, ‘working for the city.’”194 For those reasons, the Court held
that the Mayor’s executive order did not violate the dormant commerce
clause.195
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court held that an
Alaska statute violated the dormant commerce clause and that the market
participant exception did not apply to it.196 There, the Alaska Department
of Natural Resources published a notice that it would sell timber.197
However, as a condition of buying the timber, a successful bidder must
partially process the timber in Alaska before shipping it out of the state.198
This requirement only applied to state-owned timber.199 The rationale for
this requirement was to “protect existing industries, provide for the
establishment of new industries, derive revenue from all timber resources,
and manage the State’s forests on a sustained yield basis.”200 Petitioner,
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. (“South-Central”), an Alaska
corporation, was in the business of purchasing timber and selling
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

White, 460 U.S. at 214.
Id. at 205–06 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 209–10.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 211 n.7.
Id.
Id. at 214.
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84, 101 (1984).
Id. at 84.
Id.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 85 (internal quotations omitted).
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unprocessed logs, primarily to Japan.201 South-Central did not operate a mill
to process logs in Alaska.202 South-Central sued, arguing that the
requirement of processing timber in Alaska before shipping it out of the state
violated the dormant commerce clause.203 The Court agreed with SouthCentral and held, “[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that
it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which
it is a participant, but allows it to go no further.”204 The Court further
explained, “[a] State may not impose conditions, whether by statute,
regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of
that particular market.”205 For the foregoing reasons, the Court held that
Alaska’s requirement for processing timber in its state violated the dormant
commerce clause.206
At times, the distinction between a market participant and market
regulator is a difficult one to draw.207 In White, the Court explained:
there are some limits on a state or local government’s ability to impose
restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the
government transacts business. We find it unnecessary in this case to define
those limits with precision, except to say that we think the Commerce Clause
does not require the city to stop at the boundary of formal privity of
contract.208

States and territories, like California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New
York, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia, could make a
strong argument that they are participating in the market for travel, allowing
them—as a market participant—to restrict certain state-funded travel.
However, applying White and Wunnicke, state-implemented travel bans are
not saved by the market participant exception because they “impose
restrictions that reach” beyond the issuing state by banning commercial
transactions in the targeted state(s). To be sure, the whole point of stateimplemented travel bans is to “impose restrictions that reach” the targeted
state(s).
To put this point into context, consider California’s Travel Ban.
California’s Travel Ban most likely “impose[s] restrictions that reach”

201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

Id. at 85–86.
Id.
Id. at 86.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 93.
460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983) (citation omitted).
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beyond California because its goal is to restrict the exchange of goods and
services (hotel rooms, restaurants, taxicabs, and the like) in the Banned
States, in hopes that they will change their laws.209 In addition, the
consequences imposed by California’s Travel Ban affect out-of-state
businesses because those businesses would most likely lose profits due to the
ban. Because the California Travel Ban impacts the Banned States’
businesses, it imposes burdens on markets that California is not a part of (like
hotels or taxicab services). Even if California is in the market for travel, that
does not automatically mean that it is also in the market for hotels and
taxicab services of the Banned States. The Court identified a similar issue in
Wunnicke:
At the heart of the dispute in this case is disagreement over the definition of
the market. Alaska contends that it is participating in the processed timber
market, although it acknowledges that it participates in no way in the actual
processing. South–Central argues, on the other hand, that although the
State may be a participant in the timber market, it is using its leverage in
that market to exert a regulatory effect in the processing market, in which it
is not a participant. We agree with the latter position. 210

Recall Air Transport,211 discussed supra Part II.A, where the District Court
found parts of a city ordinance that prevented the City of San Francisco from
contracting with companies who discriminated between employees with
spouses and employees with domestic partners (among other groups)
violated the extraterritoriality doctrine. There, the District Court also found
that part of the city ordinance “reaches too far to be shielded by the market
participant exception.”212 The District Court highlighted that the relevant
language of the ordinance—“any of [their] operations elsewhere within the
United States”213—“create[s] a regulatory effect on the contractors’ out-ofState activities. The Ordinance, therefore, has a substantial regulatory effect
outside of the particular market in which the City [of San Francisco]
participates.”214 Thus, the District Court held that the market participant
exception did not apply.215
Applying the District Court’s reasoning in Air Transport to stateimplemented travel bans, the same could be said for state-implemented travel
209

210
211
212
213
214
215

See STATE OF CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY BILL 687-1887 (Cal. June 27,
2016), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billAnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB18
87#.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 98.
992 F. Supp. 1149 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
Id. at 1163.
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1163 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Id. at 1164.
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bans as they are precisely directed outside the market of the issuing state.
Stated differently, the entire purpose of state-implemented travel bans is to
reach and harm a market in another state hoping that the impacted state will
change its laws. For the foregoing reasons, it is unlikely that any state could
easily rely on the market participant doctrine to defend state-implemented
travel bans.
IV. THE TENTH AMENDMENT
Some might argue that states, like New York and California, may enact
state-implemented travel bans under the Tenth Amendment. To be more
exact, such critics could argue that states like New York and California may
choose how to spend their own money under the Tenth Amendment. This
potential argument carries no weight under the Court’s recent Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence.
The Tenth Amendment reads, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.”216 The interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment has not been consistent by the Court.217 The Court has had
two different views of the meaning of the Tenth Amendment.218 The first
view is that “the Tenth Amendment is not a separate constraint on Congress,
but rather is simply a reminder that Congress only may legislate if it has
authority under the Constitution.”219 The second view is that the “Tenth
Amendment reserves a zone of activity to the states for their exclusive
control, and federal laws intruding into this zone should be declared
unconstitutional by the courts.”220 The Court has shifted back and forth
between these two approaches over the past two hundred years.221 In the
216
217
218
219
220
221

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 159, at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 326–27.
Id. at 327 (footnote omitted) (“[I]n the nineteenth century, the Court took the former position and
held that a federal law was constitutional so long as Congress was acting within the scope of its
authority. In the first third of the twentieth century until 1937, the Court adopted the latter view
and found that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the states control over production and federal
laws attempting to regulate production were unconstitutional. From 1937 until the 1990s, the
Court shifted back to the former approach. In fact, during this period, there was only one case
where a federal law was found to violate the Tenth Amendment [Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)]
and this case was later expressly overruled. In the 1990s, however, the Court resurrected the Tenth
Amendment as a limit on congressional power.”).

February 2020]

THE BEGINNING OF AN ECONOMIC CIVIL WAR

449

nineteenth century, following the first view, the Court viewed the Tenth
Amendment “simply as a reminder that Congress must have authority under
the Constitution in order to legislate, not as a judicially enforceable limit on
the legislative power.”222 However, in the late nineteenth century up through
1937, the Court’ followed the second view, and instead found the Tenth
Amendment “reserves a zone of activities to the states for their exclusive
control.”223 Under this “zone of activities” approach, the Court in Hammer
v. Dagenhart found child labor was reserved “purely [to] state authority.”224
From 1937 until the early 1990s, the Court, shifting back to the first view,
found that the Tenth Amendment was “simply . . . a reminder that Congress
may legislate only if there is authority in the constitution.”225 In fact, during
this time, the Court expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart.226 Between
1937 and the early 1990s, the Court struck down one law as a violation of
the Tenth Amendment, but a few years later expressly overruled that
opinion.227
The Court’s current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment is consistent
with the second view—that the “Tenth Amendment is a key protection of
states’ rights” and any federal law that intrudes on such rights is
unconstitutional.228 More recently, the Court issued three prominent
opinions discussing the scope of the Tenth Amendment: New York v. United
States,229 Printz v. United States,230 and Reno v. Condon.231 This Article
intentionally does not discuss National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, as that case is simply an application of already well-founded principles
of New York v. United States and Printz.232
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226
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228
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230
231
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Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 159, at 332.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116–17 (1941).
See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 159, at 326–27.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (upholding the approach of
interpreting the Tenth Amendment as a safeguard against the intrusion of states’ rights by federal
governmental regulation).
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A. New York v. United States
In New York v. United States, the Court found parts of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (“Radioactive Waste
Policy”) unconstitutional as violative of the Tenth Amendment.233 The
Radioactive Waste Policy was enacted by Congress to regulate the disposal
of low-level radioactive waste “most safely and efficiently . . . on a regional
basis.”234 In order to accomplish this, the Radioactive Waste Policy provided
three different methods to encourage states to regulate the disposal of
radioactive waste within their borders.235 The Court held that the first two
methods—monetary incentives and access incentives—were not problematic
as Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause and Spending
Clause to regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste.236 However,
the Court held that the third method—the “Take Title Provision”—was
unconstitutional as it violated the Tenth Amendment.237 The third method
reads:
[i]f a State (or, where applicable, a compact region) in which low-level
radioactive waste is generated is unable to provide for the disposal of all such
waste . . . , [the State], upon the request of the generator or owner of the
waste, shall take title to the waste, be obligated to take possession of the
waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred by
such generator or owner as a consequence of the failure of the State to take
possession of the waste as soon . . . as the generator or owner notifies the
State that the waste is available for shipment. 238

The Court found the Take Title Provision problematic because a state
must either: (1) accept ownership of low-level radioactive waste and be liable
for all damages associated with the ownership of such waste or (2)
“implement legislation enacted by Congress.”239 Stated differently, under
the Take Title Provision, “[n]o matter which path the State chooses, it must
follow the direction of Congress.”240 The Court explained that “Congress
may not simply ‘commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.’”241 Further, the Court emphasized that the “Constitution . . .
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241

505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
Id. at 151 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 152.
Id. at 173–74.
Id. at 176.
Id. at 153–54 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)).
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
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‘leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’ reserved
explicitly to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Whatever the outer limits
of that sovereignty may be, one thing is clear: [t]he Federal Government may
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program.”242 Thus, the Take Title Provision was an unconstitutional
intrusion on states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment.243
B. Printz v. United States
In Printz v. United States, the Court found the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act (“Brady Act”) violated the Tenth Amendment.244 The Brady
Act essentially forced state law enforcement to perform background checks
on potential handgun purchases.245 Emphasizing the Court’s holding in New
York v. United States, the Court explained:
Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory
program. . . . Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting
the States’ officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command
the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program.246

Thus, for the reasons outlined above, the Court held that the Brady Act
violated the Tenth Amendment as it forced states to carry out federal policy:
performing background checks on handgun purchases.247
C. Reno v. Condon
In Reno v. Condon, the Court found the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of
1994 (“Driver’s Privacy Act”) constitutional as it did not violate the Tenth
Amendment.248 The Driver’s Privacy Act essentially forbade state motor
vehicle departments (“DMVs”) from selling personal information (name,
address, telephone number, vehicle description, et cetera) of drivers and
automobile owners to individuals and businesses unless the state DMVs
obtained affirmative consent from drivers and automobile owners.249
“California Senator Barbara Boxer introduced the bill after an actress in Los
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Angeles, Rebecca Schaeffer, was stalked and murdered by a man who
obtained her home address from the California Department of Motor
Vehicles.”250 South Carolina filed suit alleging that the Driver’s Privacy Act
violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments.251
The Court first held that Congress had authority to enact the Driver’s
Privacy Act under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.252 However,
the Court explained that simply having authorization under the Commerce
Clause does not “conclusively resolve the constitutionality of the [Driver’s
Privacy Act].”253 The Court emphasized this point by explaining: “[i]n New
York and Printz, we held federal statutes invalid, not because Congress lacked
legislative authority over the subject matter, but because those statutes
violated the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment.”254
After the Court explained that Congress has authority to enact the Driver’s
Privacy Act, the Court held that it was plainly distinguishable from the
federal statutes in New York and Printz.255 The Court held that unlike the
statutes in New York and Printz, the Driver’s Privacy Act “does not require
[states] to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials
to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private
individuals.”256 Thus, the Court concluded that the Driver’s Privacy Act “is
consistent with the constitutional principles enunciated in New York and
Printz.”257
New York, Printz, and Condon constitute the Court’s most recent
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment. After carefully analyzing these
cases, it is clear that the federal government can only infringe on the Tenth
Amendment if it has authority to legislate on a particular matter and if such
legislation mandates the states to do something. Thus, the converse of that
rule is as follows: as long as the federal government has authority to legislate
a particular law and as long as the law does not force the states to do
something, then the Tenth Amendment is not violated. Applying this logic,
state-implemented travel bans are not protected by the Tenth Amendment.
The dormant commerce clause by its nature is a prohibition against states
taking certain actions. The Court has repeatedly held that the dormant
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commerce clause is a valid doctrine pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
Thus, since Congress, in a sense, has authority to prevent states from
enacting legislation affecting interstate commerce and because Congress is
not forcing the states, under the dormant commerce clause, to affirmatively do
something, the Tenth Amendment is not violated under New York, Printz, or
Condon. In fact, under the Court’s current interpretation of the Tenth
Amendment, if the dormant commerce clause were codified by Congress, it
would be almost interchangeable with the factual scenario of Condon.
However, if Congress enacted legislation forcing southern states to purchase
exclusively from New York and California because Congress believes they
have strong anti-discriminatory laws, the same issues in New York and Printz
may be present as Congress would be forcing a state to affirmatively do
something, rather than prohibiting it from doing something.
This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the Tenth
Amendment coupled with the Court’s dormant commerce clause
jurisprudence: the Tenth Amendment clearly states that powers that are not
given to the federal government are reserved to the states. Because Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes,” the power to regulate commerce is not a power that
is reserved to the states. Thus, by entering the Union, the states sacrificed
some of their rights that they might have had under the Articles of
Confederation,258 and one of the rights they sacrificed was the ability to
legislate on matters that affect259 interstate commerce. For the foregoing
reasons, an argument grounded in the Tenth Amendment will not shield
state-implemented travel bans.
CONCLUSION
It is paramount that state legislatures respect our nation’s Constitution as
well as duly enacted laws in other states. State-implemented travel bans do
neither. Thus, they are unconstitutional.
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See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979) (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 533–34 (1949)) (noting that the Commerce Clause “reflected a central concern of the
Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation.”).
See supra text accompanying note 98.

454

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

The Court’s dormant commerce clause jurisprudence has consistently
held that states may not enact statutes that affect interstate commerce.260 If
a state implements a travel ban against other states, influenced by political
disagreement, the issuing state’s travel ban would be contrary to the dormant
commerce clause because commerce would inevitably be affected in the
targeted states. In fact, that is precisely what state-implemented travel bans
are designed to do—affect commercial transactions in the targeted states in
hopes that the targeted states will change their policies.
As extensively discussed in this Article, none of the dormant commerce
clause exceptions neatly apply to state-implemented travel bans because:
Congress did not give any state the authority to enact travel bans against
other states, state-implemented travel bans do not satisfy the Taylor test , and
the market participant exception is inapplicable.
The Court’s current Tenth Amendment jurisprudence does not
authorize state-implemented travel bans either because Congress has plenary
authority to prevent state statutes affecting interstate commerce pursuant to
the Commerce Clause. Furthermore, Congress is not coercing states to do
something. Instead, Congress is preventing states from doing something,
which has never been found to be violative of the Tenth Amendment. It is
extremely unlikely that the Tenth Amendment was designed for states to use
their funds to financially punish other states with different political beliefs.
Thus, state-implemented travel bans would most likely be deemed
unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause, and the Tenth
Amendment does not save them.

260
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